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IN THE SUPREME cciuwr OF THE STATE OF lJTMI
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19,138

vs.
OREM CITY, a municipal corporation of the State of
Utah; PAYSON CITY, a
municipal corporation of the
State of Utah; and PLEASANT
GROVE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State
of Utah,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal

a decision granting respondent's

Motion for Summary Judgment.
IN LOWER COURT
The Fourth District Court granted respondent, Utah
County's, Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of
whether the appellant cities have a duty under Utah law
to reimburse the respondent for the costs incurred in
housing violators of municipal ordinances in the county
jail.

The Court ruled that the cities do have a duty to

rcirr.u r

c'

the

courrty on th<

basis of Section 10-8-58, U.C.A.

as amended), and the case of Grand Forks County v.
City of !jr·and

123 ! .. 111.2d 42 (N.D.

1963).

NATURE OF' RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the judgment beloVI.
STATEMErJT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts set
forth in &ppcllants' Brief.

ARGUMEUT
POINT I
UNDER UTAH LAW, APPELLANTS ARE REQUIRED
TO PAY THE COST OF' HOUSING THEIR RESPECTIVE PRISONERS IN THE UTAH COUNTY JAIL.
Section 10-8-58, U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), relating to

the duties of cities, provides as follows:
Tliey may establish, erect and maintain city
jails, houses of corrections and workhouses for the
confinement of persons convicted of violating any city
ordinances, make rules and regulations for the government of the same, appoint necessary jailers and keepers,
and use the county jail for the confinement or punishment
of offenders, subject to such conditions as are imposed
by law, and with the consent of the board of count
commissioners.
emphasis added
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In a case nearly identical to t:

one at hand, the 31rrer:e

of l!orth Dakota ruled that base_

on a statute similar to Sec:lon 10-d-58 U.C.A., a municipality
was liable to the count/ for the cost of housinb municipal
prisoners in tho county jail despite the fact that the municir
tiaJ never· been billed.
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Al tl10clf'h i L i:; t:·Ll··· : L:it no state has a st2.tutory scheme
identical to that or 'ltah, appellants have failed to cite any
authority contrary to the general rule that cities are liable
for the cost or housing city prisoners in the county jail.
Sections 17-15-17(3) and 17-22-8, U.C.A.,

(1953, as amended)

are relied upon by appellants to demonstrate Utah County's
liability for providing free food and housing to any person
by competent authority.

Such an interpretation

directly conflicts with other related statutes which without
exception indicate a legislative intent to place ultimate
liability on tho3P entities which impose a burden on the incarceration system.

With respect to towns, Section 10-13-23 U.C.A.,

as amended) provides as follows:

10-13-23. Ordinances--Punishment for violation.-To enforce obedience to the ordinances of the town the
board of trustees may ordain and provide such fines, forfeitures and penalties as it may deem proper; provided,
that the fine or penalty for any offense shall be less
than $100, and the imprisonment shall not exceed three
months.
All expenses incurred in prosecutions for the
recovery of any fine, forfeiture or penalty shall be
p:,id by the corporation.
In case any person is committed
to the county or municipal jail or other place of incarcer:ition as punishment or in default of the payment of a
fine, or Cine and costs, he shall be required to work for
the town at such labor as his strength will permit not
eight hours in each working day.
And a judgment
that the defendant pay a fine, or a fine and costs, may
also
that he be imprisoned until the amount thereof
i:; s.1.tlsfied, sp·2.:if:,·ing the extent of imprisonment, which
exceed one da; for each $2 of such amount.
The

expense of boardine; p1·1snner:;_sl_i:t_J_l____t:'._e_['.51id by th0
corporation.
The board 01·
may erect a jail
for the town, and
committed for· violation of'
town ordinances may he imprisoned therein.
(emphao;L;
added)
Section 77-18-1(4), U.C.A.

(1953, as amended) requires

reimbursement from the State of Utah for the costs of housinE
a convicted felon sentenced to serve in the county jail as a
condition of probation.

Section 17-22-9, U.C.A.

0953, as

amended) requires the Federal government to reimburse the count
for the cost of housing Federal prisoners at the county jail.
And, as heretofore stated, Section 10-8-58 requires that cities
reimburse the county for the cost of housing municipal
in the county jail.
The rule is well settled that statutes which treat the
subject matter should be interpreted as if they were intended:
be consistent.
Under this rule, each statute or section is
construed in light of, with reference to, or in
connection with, other statutes or sections.
The
object of the rule is to ascertain and carry into
effect the intention of the legislature.
It proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes
were governed by one spirit and policy, and were intended to be consistent and harmonious in their
several parts and provisions.
Section 348, 50 Am. Jur.

393-345.

The proper interpretation of Sections 17-15-17(3) and

17-22-8 is not that these statutes impose ultimate financial
liability, but rather that they generally impose the duty of
initial payment on the plaintiff, and are silent as to ultima'.
liability which in accordance with Sections 10-8-58, 10-13-23,

77-18-1 and 17-22-9 is placed upon the responsible political
entity.

Such an interpretation would be in accordance with
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the system n:ust bear the ultimate financial liability

for tile related cost.

17-15-17(11), U.C.A.

An example of this would be Section

(1953, as amended) which states that the

county is liable for all expenses necessarily incurred by the
county sheriff in his civil duties.

Section 21-2-4, U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), however, requires that many, if not most of
these expenses, are to be collected as fees from those persons
requesting the sheriff's services, thereby imposing ultimate
liability on the responsible entity.
Appellants also cite Section 32-1-24, U.C.A. (1953, as
amended) recently enacted during the 1983 General Session of the
Utah Legislature, as lending weight to its argument.

The new

enactment provides in part that a portion of revenue from a
beer excise tax shall be allocated to the counties for confinement
or rehabilitation or both, and construction and maintenance of
facilities for confinement or rehabilitation or both of persons
arrested for or convicted of alcohol related offenses.

Guidelines

for the use of such funds are set forth as follows:
The appropriation provided for by this section is
intended to supplement the budget of the law enforcement agencies of each city, town, and county within
the state and not to replace funds which would otherwise be allocated for law enforcement or confinement
or rehabilitation or both of persons arrested for or
convicted of alcohol related offenses.
[Section
32-1-24, U.C.A. (1953, as amended)].
(emphasis added)
The above guidelines evidence a legislative intent that
SJ.id r.onies are not to be used to replace funds which have already

of the Utah Legislature dl:l not

I'L'!

10-8-58, and 77-18-1(4), it

c•:tl Section:;

10-13-23,

follows that the

ture did not intend these monies to replace the funds which

ti 0·

law towns, cities, and the State of Utah are required to provid•
when housing their respective prisoners in the county jail.
Section 32-1-24 is a legislative reponse to the increased
costs associated with more stringent drunk-driving laws.

It

should not be interpreted as lending weight to an argument
which would decrease funding for those entities such as Utah
County which are legally required to shoulder the cost of both
construction and maintenance of jails and rehabilitation centers
as well as the confinement of both county and state alcohol
offenders.
POINT II
CITY USE OF THE COUNTY JAIL IS STRICTLY
CONTINGENT ON THE APPROVAL OF THE COUNTY
COMMISSION.
THE PERMISSIVE NATURE OF SUCH
USE CREATES A MUliICIPAL POWER TO CONTRACT
WITH THE COUNTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF JAIL USE
AND THE CITIES ARE OBLIGATED ON IMPLIED
CONTRACT TO PAY THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE
BENEFITS THEY RECEIVE, ACCEPT, AND APPROPRIATE.
As noted above, the legislature has devised a scheme of
local criminal justice administration which allows each unit of
local government to adopt and enforce ordinances applicable to
local needs.

With the exception of Circuit Court locations,

it has also granted local governments the use of all fine and
forfeiture money.

Those cities with a Circuit Court are grante

50% of all forfeitures, the remaining monies going to the
7

0:· 1;t;:1h tu

the Cic,cuit Court's expenses.

l.ct u-.·. ha:o a.I';" ;·.r·;int c-J
col

The legis-

eovernments the power to levy and

Ln:cs t0 sufJport its municipal functions including

crimin'll justice costs.

In keeping with this principal,

Sections 10-b-58 and 10-13-23 allow municipalities to establish,
erect, and maintain city jails, houses of corrections, and
working houses for the confinement of persons convicted of violating city ordinances.

Such provisions indicate that the

legislative intent was to create in cities, under local control and
financing, the means for punishing violators of city ordinances.
In addition, under Section 10-8-b5, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), the
legislature granted cities the power to command the labor of
individuals committed to the county jail on city projects.

This

grant confers a substantial benefit to cities in reduced labor
costs.

In discussing a

statute, the Court in Grand Forks

County v. City of Grand Forks stated that:
Thus we see that the legislature provided that
fines imposed for violation of a city ordinance, as
well as work performed by a prisoner during his
confinement, all inure to the benefit of the city.
Surely, the legislature would not have intended that
the expense of maintaining a city prisoner during his
confinement in the county jail should be paid by the
county, but that all of the benefits which might be
derived from the imprisonment of offenders should inure
to the benefit of the city.
In granting the above powers and benefits to municipalities,
the legislature also recognized that in some instances it may be
uneconomical for all cities and towns to establish municipal
jails.

In response to this, the legislature allowed municipalities

to make other arrangements for the incarceration of city prisoners.

8
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of its jail.
tics have beCO':tC li.:tb]L'

lttq•l

Uli'.l•.'1'
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t

incarcerating municipal prisoners.
The rule is well settled that a municipality or other
political subdivision may become obligated on an implied contra
to pay the reasonable value of benefits which it receives, acre>
and appropriates, where the municipality has the power to contr2
for such benefits.
Sec.

38 Am. Jur., "Municipal Corporations",

515, p. 193; 84 ALR, p. 937.

It was dee reed in Grand Forl:c

County that:
While there was no express agreement between the
governing body of the city and the governing body of the
county touching upon the care and maintenance of city
prisoners in the county jail, the statute authorized
such an agreement.
Under such circumstances, an implied
contract arose from the request of the city that its
prisoners be confined in the county jail.
Appellants do not dispute the validity of such a rule but
argue that it does not apply in the instant case inasmuch as nc
benefit is conferred upon the city when the county sheriff is
legally required to accept all duly committed prisoners.

Where

a municipality is under a duty to eithec house its own prisoner:
or pay to house them in the county jail, a benefit is received
when the county provides food and lodging foe said prisoners,
regardless of whether or not the county sheriff is required by
law to accept the prisoner.

This position was upheld by the

9

···f·l"

r-. •.
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·. n ;;onrJt:,:t Co11nty where the Court stated:

r; i o l off i c er· o f th c
:it le<Jst U1e force of' a request;
etn·1 ttiv ('XI
of
its ordinances being
ir:.r•c•scd upot1
.it:,; by la1v, a promise to pay
tl1u·c·fur·c is imf•lied.

city

· r '" r . i t n:· n '· t, ..· U , , · j u d i

Jri

Appellants also argue that they in fact do not use the Utah
County Jail inasmuch as the commitment papers are signed by a
Circuit Court Judge, rather than a City Judge.

This argument

would n•1t apply to appellants, t'leasant Grove City and Payson
City, which are not Circuit Court locations.

Appellant, Orem

City, has been a Circuit Court location since the creation of a
Circuit Court system in

1977.

However, it is Orem City which

en:1cts the or·dinances, arTc·sts tlic violator, requests that the
alle 1;Pd violator be held in the Utah County Jail when bail is
not posted,

the violator, and requests that the Judge

entt:r a ;r,uilty plea v;ith t!1e resulto.nt fine or jail time.
it is in

Surely,

an Or·cm City prisoner, not a state prisoner who

is thereafter confined in the Utah County Jail.
'!'he ar;-;urnent

ror esto.ulishlnt•; a basis for municipal liability

under an implied contract ir1 the instant case is further strengthened by the f'act that until

1977, appellants' practice was to

reimburse the respondent for the use of its jail to house municipal
prisorn.:r·s, thecccby demonstrating an awareness by appellants of
tht:ir· cuntractual oblit'.ati,.ns.
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The Utah Supr«.·r11c: Cu111·t in ::tale v.
(1901), interpreted Article XJTI,

as requiring that county

taxation be limited to cuunty pur·poses.

The Court also ruled

that:
Under the constitution the state has no
power to make a disposition of county funds, and
require that they be appropriated for other and
different purposes than those for which by
authority of the county they were collected.
It has been appellants'

position that the enforcement of

city ordinances is a "state" purpose, for which the state can
require the use of

funds.

Annellants

rely on the case

of Salt Lake County v. :::«lt L:1ke City, 134 !'. 560 (1913), as
autlwrity for such a pc1siliurl.

A care!'ul re'adi11c; of thl:;; case

indicates that the Court actually supports plaintiff's positior
that the enforcement of city ordinances is not a state-wide
or even county-wide concern for which county funds may be exper.
In Salt Lake County v. Scilt Lake City, the Cuurt upheld a
statute which pr'ovided tl1at botll the city i.tnd the county share
the cost of maintaining a juvenile center.

The Court dee lareJ

that to protect, care for, and ed11cate the indigent and delln·1·
children who would someday assume the responsibilities of c11•·
ship was a "public duty" and ".

one in which every taxpayc·

of the State of Utah was interested in".
11

r,,; :, ,.,
:111d

wa3
not.

l, tfi,_.

c·ity '"" "c.l:tL•

Lc,_:islature could require both county

:q,<·nc:i·;cc"

t.u fund tlic prot;rarn.

The Court

to point out, however, that the legislature could
Lr1t•:rfcrc with activities which are a function of city

government; am.l that the laH in question did not affect local
self government.
As was pointed out in

!'espondcnt's initial memorandum, by

no stretch of the imagination could the enforcement within a
city of violations pertaining to Class

"B"

and "C" misdemeanors

be considered a state-wide public purpose, or one in which every
taxpayer in the State of Utah is interested.

To the contrary,

both the legislature and the Supreme Court have indicated that
law enforcement within a political subdivision is not a countywide concern.
The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City Corporation v. Salt
Lake County, 550 P.2d 1291 (1976), upheld the language of
Section 17-34-1-5 U.C.A.

(1953, as amended) which required that

services provided by a county to its unincorporated area were to
be paid from special service districts which collect taxes only
from property in the unincorporated area of the county.
Court declared that:

The

"To hold that the county may provide ser-

vices without attempting to collect money to defray the cost
would serve as an unjust burden upon the city residents."
It follows, therefore, that taxpayers in the unincorporated
area of the county should not be required to help pay the cost of
housing violators of city ordinances.
12
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Court in McCormick and

? and

c,;.

) ut'

i'd'l, i(_:

11· >:TI l.

v. n'";,;,·tt, lOIJ f'.:'rl o')2 (1917),

interpreted Sections 2 and 3 uf Article XIII of the Utah Constitution as follows:
These provisions (Sections 2 and 3, Article
XIII) of the constitution in plain and explicit
terms provide that there shall be a uniform rate of
taxation in this state so that every person, company,
and corporation will be compelled to bear, as nearly as
may be, his, her, or its pro-rata of the burdens of
general taxation according to the value of the taxable
property of such person or corporation.
Section 17-29-3 U.C.A.

(1953, as amended), requires that

residents of the unincorporated area of Utah County pay a specia
tax for law enforcement over and above the taxes collected for
general county purposes.

If county funds are used to pay for

part of city law enforcement by housing city prisoners, then
residents of the unincorporated area are being doubly taxed.
Therefore, appellants'

interpretation of Sections 17-15-17(3)

and 17-22-8 would result in an unconstitutional application of
the law.
COHCLUSI01!
Defendants' interpretation of the law would result in
flicting laws and their unconstitutional application.

Plaintir:·

interpretation of the law would result in a fair and constitutional process for meeting the expense of housing municipal
violators in the county jail.

The rule has always been to

interpret a statute so as not to conflict with other statutes,
and to maintain its constitutional validity.
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For al 1 the

I.
]·•·'I, "1' 1·1 I

day of July, 1983.

. .,U this

tJU!\I.

1,

T. vlOOTTOll

Utah County f,ttorney

STERLI t

Deput

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

l hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to B1·yce McEuen, Orem City
Attorney, 56 North State Street, Orem, Utah 84057; Dave
McMullin, Payson City Attorney, P.O. Box 176, Payson, Utah
b4G51; and John C. Backlund, Pleasant Grove City Attorney,
1021 tlorth University, h200, Provo, Utah $46011,
day of July, 1983.

S-ecretary
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